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Ricardo Baptista Leite7,8, Andrew Hill9 and Margaret Hellard1,10,11,12*
Abstract
Direct-acting antivirals (DAAs) have dramatically changed the landscape of hepatitis C treatment and prevention. The
World Health Organization has called for the elimination of hepatitis C as a public health threat by 2030. However, the
discrepancy in DAA prices across low-, middle- and high-income countries is considerable, ranging from less than US$
100 to approximately US$ 40,000 per course, thus representing a major barrier for the scale-up of treatment and
elimination. This article describes DAA pricing and pathways to accessing affordable treatment, providing case
studies from Australia, Egypt and Portugal. Pathways to accessing DAAs include developing comprehensive viral
hepatitis plans to facilitate price negotiations, voluntary and compulsory licenses, patent opposition, joint
procurement, and personal importation schemes. While multiple factors influence the price of DAAs, a key driver
is a country’s capacity and willingness to negotiate with pharmaceutical companies. If negotiations do not lead
to a reasonable price, governments have the option to utilise flexibilities outlined in the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Affordable access to DAAs is underpinned by collaboration
between government, civil society, global organisations and pharmaceutical companies to ensure that all patients
can access treatment. Promoting these pathways is critical for influencing policy, improving access to affordable
DAAs and achieving hepatitis C elimination.
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Background
An estimated 67 million people live with chronic hepatitis
C infection worldwide [1]. Chronic hepatitis C causes
cirrhosis, liver cancer and approximately 399,000 deaths
annually [2]. Globally, people who inject drugs (PWID)
have the highest hepatitis C prevalence (42–62%) [3]. In
2016, the World Health Organization (WHO) set targets
for eliminating hepatitis C as a public health threat, calling
for an 80% reduction in incidence and a 65% reduction in
related deaths by 2030 [4]. WHO estimates that approxi-
mately 1.5 million new hepatitis C infections occur annu-
ally [1], yet, in 2017, only 1.6 million patients were treated
for hepatitis C and fewer than 1.5 million are expected to
be treated in 2018 [1]. If current trajectories of new
infections and treatment uptake continue, hepatitis C will
certainly not be eliminated by 2030 and only 12 countries
are likely to achieve elimination [1]. Therefore, a
multi-pronged approach that includes the scale-up of af-
fordable treatment is essential to achieve elimination [5–7].
The advent of direct-acting antivirals (DAAs) in 2013 led
to optimism that hepatitis C elimination is achievable [8].
DAAs have a cure rate of over 95%, treatment duration of
only 8–12 weeks, and fewer and less severe side-effects
than their predecessors [2]. However, in many countries,
DAA prices discourage treatment, impeding progress
towards elimination [9, 10], and whilst DAA prices have
declined, they vary considerably – from less than US$ 100
per treatment course to approximately US$ 40,000 [9, 11,
12]. This paper describes current pricing of DAAs and
highlights the pathways and mechanisms for governments
and civil society to access affordable treatment.
Drug development
The advancing of drugs through research and develop-
ment (R&D) is a long-term process, with an only 12%
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probability of a drug gaining marketing approval [13].
Estimates of the average R&D cost vary from US$ 161
million [14] to US$ 2.6 billion per drug, including
approved and unsuccessful compounds and opportunity
costs [13]. Additional costs post-approval include
surveillance, manufacturing, distribution and marketing.
Marketing authorisation
Following clinical trials, drug companies must obtain mar-
keting authorisation to sell their products (e.g. through the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or European Medi-
cines Agency). Over 2011–2015, the FDA and European
Medicines Agency median approval times for new thera-
peutic agents were 306 and 383 days, respectively [15].
Accelerated review processes apply for important medi-
cines that treat serious conditions and fill an unmet need
or demonstrate substantial improvements over existing
treatments [16]. For example, the FDA granted sofosbuvir,
a highly effective DAA manufactured by Gilead Sciences, a
priority review [17], and it was approved for the treatment
of chronic hepatitis C within 242 days of application [18].
DAA pricing
Upon marketing approval, decisions on pricing and reim-
bursement are required. These decisions vary according to
whether governments negotiate discounts or whether
pharmaceutical companies set prices [19]. In 2013, the
price of sofosbuvir ranged from US$ 900 in Egypt to US$
95,000 in the US [11, 12, 20]. Since then, other DAAs have
been released and generic DAAs have begun to generate
competition, leading to discounted prices [9]. Additionally,
manufacturing costs have also fallen, with the costs of a
12-week course of sofosbuvir estimated at US$ 47 [21].
DAAs contribute significantly to pharmaceutical com-
pany profits. In 2017, Gilead reported US$ 26.1 billion in
sales, including US$ 9.1 billion from DAAs [22]. In 2017,
Bristol-Myers Squibb’s product revenue totalled US$ 20.8
billion, including US$ 406 million from hepatitis C prod-
ucts [23]. Whilst the exact costs of DAA R&D, manufac-
turing and distribution are unknown, sales data suggest
that pharmaceutical companies make significant profits
from DAAs, particularly from high-income countries.
The initial price of DAAs was particularly daunting as it
required governments to dedicate large proportions of
their health budget to hepatitis C treatment [24]. However,
despite DAA manufacturing costs falling, prices still vary,
remaining stubbornly high in certain countries [11]. A
number of high-income countries, including Australia,
Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Scotland,
Spain and Sweden, have negotiated price agreements that
allow most patients to access DAAs, enabling a broad
public health response rather than a disease-staged
approach [12]. In 2015, Georgia, a middle-income country,
established the world’s first hepatitis C elimination
demonstration project, with Gilead Sciences providing free
treatment for all patients [25]. Georgia’s elimination plan
derived from strong political commitment, public support
and health system capacity [26].
Other countries (e.g. US [10], Denmark and Poland [12])
are paying higher prices for DAAs, necessitating treatment
restrictions based on fibrosis stage and substance use [27,
28]. A review showed that, of 35 European countries and
jurisdictions, 46% restricted treatment to patients with
fibrosis at stage F2 or higher and 17% required abstinence
from illicit substances [28]. Importantly, these restrictions
were not based on treatment effectiveness, with DAAs
achieving > 95% cure rates in patients without cirrhosis or
with compensated cirrhosis, PWID and those who
consume alcohol [29–32] and 78–87% cure rates for
patients with compensated cirrhosis [33]. Additionally, the
key to preventing new infections is stopping viral transmis-
sion. Mathematical modelling demonstrates that PWID
with hepatitis C must be treated to reduce incidence and
reach WHO elimination targets [34, 35]. Hence, treatment
restrictions for PWID and other priority groups must be
lifted.
Pathways to accessing DAAs
Whilst DAA price reductions in some countries facilitate
greater treatment access, prices need to be affordable
worldwide. A government’s capacity to negotiate with
pharmaceutical companies is a key driver of drug prices.
Other pathways to accessing affordable DAAs include
voluntary and compulsory licensing, patent opposition, per-
sonal importation schemes, and joint procurement (Fig. 1).
Centralised price negotiations
In the US, some patients are eligible for DAAs through
Medicare (federal health insurance for people who are
older or disabled) and Medicaid (government-subsidised
healthcare programmes for people with low income) [36].
While Medicare cannot negotiate drug prices directly [9],
Medicaid has previously obtained manufacturer rebates for
HIV drugs above the required Medicaid price discounts for
all drugs. The Veterans Health Administration can negoti-
ate deals for veterans and private insurance companies can
negotiate for clients [37]. However, strict confidentiality
agreements between payers and manufacturers prevent
price transparency [36]. Consequently, US patients pay
substantially more for DAAs than citizens of other
high-income countries, thus reducing treatment access [9].
US states and insurance companies vary considerably
regarding DAA restrictions and reimbursement based
on fibrosis stage, substance use, co-infection with
HIV and prescriber type [38]. However, several states
have relaxed their DAA criteria, allowing increased
treatment utilisation [39].
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Despite restrictions on drug price negotiation in the US,
legislation (under 28 U.S.C. §1498) permits the government
to purchase generic medications at less than 1% of their
branded list price plus a reasonable royalty [37]. During
the 2001 anthrax outbreak, the US Government threatened
to use this legal provision, leading to swift negotiations
with the manufacturer for reduced medication costs [37].
This mechanism could be used to reduce DAA prices.
In other countries, governments can negotiate a reason-
able price for pharmaceuticals with patent holders [40].
Australia and Portugal have negotiated volume-based
agreements with pharmaceutical companies (case studies
1 and 2), and Italy and Spain have negotiated DAA course
prices of less than € 8000. It is apparent that pharmaceut-
ical companies are willing to negotiate reasonable prices
when governments present plans that ensure a greater
number of patients undertake treatment.
Intellectual property law
In 1994, the World Trade Organization (WTO) established
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) [40]. The TRIPS Agreement sets
global minimum requirements for creating and protecting
intellectual property. WTO members, excluding those
regarded as least developed countries (LDCs) (low-income
countries at high risk of economic and environmental
shocks), must provide patent protection for inventions for
at least 20 years [41]. Although patents provide an incentive
to innovate, they can also create monopolies, reduce com-
petition and increase prices [42]. Patent holders can prevent
generic versions of patented medicines from being pro-
duced or made available. However, LDCs are not obliged to
provide or enforce medicine patents or data protection
until at least 2033, allowing the legal production and mar-
keting of generic medicines in these countries [43].
The basic compound patent for sofosbuvir expires in a
number of patent-granting countries in 2025 [44]. Upon
patent expiry, generics can be freely produced and dissemi-
nated, creating competition and reducing costs for govern-
ments and consumers [45, 46]. For example, generic
competition for HIV antiretroviral therapy (ART) contrib-
uted to a 99% price reduction [47]. The TRIPS Agreement
also enables governments to prevent a patent’s monopoly ef-
fects and access generics prior to patent expiry (Fig. 2) [41].
In 2001, the WTO adopted the Doha Declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health, clarifying that TRIPS should not hamper
governments’ ability to protect public health and listing
flexibilities enabling widespread access to medicines [48].
Compulsory licenses and public non-commercial use licenses
Examples of TRIPS flexibilities that WTO member states
can use to pursue public health goals include granting
compulsory licenses to third parties without patent holder
consent and public non-commercial or government use of
patents [41, 44]. These licenses allow local production or
importation of generics [20]. Importantly, TRIPS does not
Fig. 1 Pathways to accessing direct-acting antivirals
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require prior negotiations for a voluntary license in emer-
gency or urgent situations [41]. In January 2017, WTO
amended TRIPS with article 31(bis) to provide a special
compulsory license to supply medicines to countries with-
out sufficient production capacity [49]. Article 31(bis)
allows Regional Economic Communities, consisting
mostly of LDCs (all African), to bundle demand to supply
the entire region, regardless of whether a developing
country or an LDC will benefit.
Compulsory licensing (particularly non-commercial
use licenses) facilitated procurement of generic ART for
HIV when voluntary licenses were unavailable [50].
However, middle- and high-income countries that use
compulsory licensing for DAAs are likely to experience
significant opposition from manufacturers defending
their monopoly and from countries where multinational
pharmaceutical companies operate and manufacture
[51]. To date, only Malaysia has issued a compulsory
license for a DAA (late 2017) [44].
Voluntary licenses
Pharmaceutical companies can establish agreements with
generic manufacturers allowing the manufacture and sale
of lower-priced generics before patent expiry [44, 52]. In
2010, the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) was established to
negotiate voluntary licenses with patent holders to supply
ART in low- and middle-income countries [53]. MPP
licenses will save the global health community an estimated
US$ 2.3 billion for HIV treatment over 2010–2028 [53].
The MPP’s remit recently expanded to include DAAs,
listing daclatasvir (GSK) in 2016. Prior to this expansion,
Gilead established voluntary licensing agreements with
11 Indian companies, enabling them to manufacture and
market bioequivalent DAAs in 101 low-income coun-
tries. Generic manufacturers with a voluntary license set
their own price and pay royalties to Gilead [54]. These
agreements excluded Brazil, China, Morocco and
Thailand, middle-income countries with high hepatitis C
burdens [55, 56]. However, countries can issue a
compulsory license and produce or purchase generic
medications, including from sub-licensees [51]. Interest-
ingly, when Malaysia issued a compulsory license for
sofosbuvir, Gilead responded by including Malaysia,
Thailand, Ukraine and Belarus in their license agreement
territory, showing the direct and indirect power of
compulsory licensing [57].
Fig. 2 TRIPS flexibilities retrieved from Medicines Law & Policy
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Gilead Sciences has provided voluntary licenses for
both ARTs and DAAs. Bristol-Myers Squibb has licensed
daclatasvir to MPP for sale in 112 countries [58].
Patent opposition
Pharmaceutical companies can be prevented from secur-
ing a monopoly using patent opposition [59]. In 2015,
Médecins du Monde and civil society organisations from
17 countries challenged Gilead’s sofosbuvir patent, leading
to amendment of the patent claims [60] and availability of
generic versions of sofosbuvir in Europe in 2024 rather
than 2028 [61]. Civil society organisations launched simi-
lar oppositions in Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia,
India, Ukraine and the US [61]. In 2012, Médecins Sans
Frontières established a patent opposition database to
disseminate information on claims and oppositions [62],
an important tool for transparency and collaboration
between public health groups and legal and technical
experts on pharmaceutical patent challenges.
Joint procurement
Governments can obtain lower pharmaceutical prices by
allowing a subset of payers to negotiate prices as one en-
tity [44, 63]. Benefits of joint procurement include allow-
ing authorities to negotiate volume-based discounts, reap
administrative savings and pool skillsets [44, 64]. Joint
procurement can occur through collaborative agreements
between contracting authorities or through permanent
joint procurement organisations [64]. In 2015, Mercosur
(a trade block involving Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
Uruguay and Venezuela) and associated countries (Chile,
Colombia, Peru and Ecuador) completed the first joint
procurement of DAAs with support from the Pan Ameri-
can Health Organization Strategic Fund [65], securing the
lowest price in the region (US$ 2292 per treatment) [66].
In 2017, the Centre for Disease Analysis Foundation
established the Global Procurement Fund (GPRO) to sup-
port expanded access to affordable and quality treatments
in low- and middle-income countries [67]. GPRO uses
pooled purchasing to negotiate prices for large volumes of
DAAs, with 104 countries currently accessing sofosbuvir
through this mechanism [68]. Drugs supplied by GPRO
must meet quality standards from WHO, a stringent regu-
latory authority or an independent expert review panel
[67]. In 2008, the European Commission released a fact
sheet to aid organisations to establish joint procurement
[64]; however, this is yet to be employed for DAAs. Effect-
ive procurement of DAAs requires reliable surveillance and
modelling data to predict the number of patients who need
treatment [44].
Personal importation schemes
In various countries (e.g. Australia [69], Italy [70] and
Switzerland [71]), patients are legally entitled to import
1–3 months of personal medication. Patients living in
countries without subsidised access to treatment can
purchase generic DAAs through online buyers’ clubs [52].
The Australian-based FixHepC Buyers Club allows
patients with a prescription to import a 12-week course of
generic sofosbuvir and daclatasvir for US$ 1000 [72]. Cure
rates of generic DAAs imported into Australia are similar
to branded treatments [73]. However, in some countries,
physicians cannot prescribe unlicensed medications [56].
Indeed, personal importation is not a long-term solution,
with treatment uptake being somewhat ad hoc rather than
part of a cohesive public health response.
Case study 1: Australia
In Australia, the Therapeutic Goods Administration
(TGA) regulates the pharmaceutical sector [74] and the
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) subsidises listed
medications for Australian residents [75]. General and
concession patients make co-payments of AU$ 39.50 and
AU$ 6.40 per script, respectively [76]. If a TGA-approved
drug is not listed on the PBS, Australians can still access
these medications, although generally at full price.
Pharmaceutical companies can apply for PBS listing
through the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee
(PBAC) [75]. If the PBAC recommends the drug, the
Department of Health negotiates a subsidised price with
the pharmaceutical company [75].
In 2014, the TGA approved sofosbuvir for the wholesale
cost of AU$ 110,000 per course. After long price negotia-
tions between the government and pharmaceutical
companies, PBAC recommended DAAs for PBS listing on
March 1, 2016. The Australian government budgeted
approximately AU$ 1.2 billion over 5 years to treat hepa-
titis C [56], following a volume-based, risk-sharing deal
with pharmaceutical companies [56]. Treatment costs are
capped at approximately AU$ 250 million annually, regard-
less of the number of people treated [77], yet the ‘base
price’ the government pays per treatment is thought to be
approximately AU$ 12,000–15,000. However, if annual
treatment costs exceed the annual cap, these are covered
by the pharmaceutical companies; therefore, the more
patients treated, the lower the cost per course, which
incentivises treatment scale-up. Between March 2016 and
June 2017, approximately 43,360 patients (19% of all
Australian patients with hepatitis C) were treated [78] at an
estimated cost of less than US$ 8000 per course, one of the
lowest prices per patient in high-income countries.
Importantly, prescribing guidelines allow treatment by
specialists, general practitioners and nurse practitioners,
facilitating uptake of treatment outside hospital settings
[79]. Further, fibrosis and substance use do not affect
eligibility [79]. Based on PBS co-payment schemes, gen-
eral patients pay out-of-pocket AU$ 120 and concession
patients pay AU$ 20 per treatment course [76], making
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the DAA price for individual patients one of the lowest
globally.
Case study 2: Portugal
Initially, in Portugal, DAAs cost approximately € 40,000
per patient [12] and treatment was restricted to patients
with severe cirrhosis who required a liver transplant, which
led to community advocacy in the media and parliament
[80] designed to shift discussions about hepatitis C from
prevention to cure [80]. In February 2015, the Portuguese
government announced a risk-sharing and volume-based
agreement with Gilead, enabling universal access to treat-
ment for all patients, regardless of fibrosis stage [80, 81].
Gilead would initially only receive payment per patient (less
than € 7000) if treatment led to a cure. A national registry
was established to monitor cure rates 12 weeks
post-treatment [81]. As of July 2017, 17,591 patients had
been authorised treatment, 11,972 patients had initiated
treatment and 6639 (96.5%) patients were clinically cured
[82]. The programme has averted 3477 premature liver
deaths, 339 liver transplants and 5417 cases of cirrhosis
[83], and saved the government over € 271 million on treat-
ment of hepatitis C complications [83]. A national plan to
improve care is currently under development [84].
Case study 3: Egypt
Egypt has the highest hepatitis C prevalence worldwide
[85], mostly attributable to transmission through injections
to treat schistosomiasis between the 1950s and 1980s [85].
In 2008, an estimated 9.8% of Egypt’s population aged 15–
59 years was hepatitis C positive; prevalence was highest
among those aged 50–59 [86]. In 2015, the estimated
prevalence among those aged 15–59 years declined to 7.0%
[87], predominantly due to ageing of the population with
hepatitis C [88, 89].
In 2006, the National Committee for Control of Viral
Hepatitis was established to measure hepatitis C burden
and prepare a national treatment programme [90] and,
in 2014, a national plan for prevention, control and
treatment of viral hepatitis was released. The National
Committee for Control of Viral Hepatitis and the Health
Insurance Organization set up 189 government treat-
ment facilities and created a national online database to
register patients [91]. Importantly, the Egyptian govern-
ment rejected patent applications for sofosbuvir, enab-
ling local production and supply of generics [92]. In
2014, Egypt had a limited supply of branded sofosbuvir,
which cost US$ 900 for a 12-week treatment course –
still expensive relative to Egypt’s financial resources [91].
Treatment was restricted to patients with advanced fi-
brosis, hepatitis B or HIV co-infection, and post-liver
transplants, leading to long waiting lists [91]. Subse-
quently, negotiations and generic production reduced
prices significantly and DAAs became available to all
patients [91]. Between October 2014 and December
2017, 1.4 million patients commenced treatment, with
cure rates above 90% [91]. Because there are no com-
pound patents on sofosbuvir and daclatasvir in Egypt
[93], treatment is now available for US$ 84 per treat-
ment course from generic manufacturers [21]. In 2016,
the Ministry of Health established the Viral Hepatitis
Control Administration, aiming to reduce new infec-
tions, screen 10 million people, eliminate waiting lists
and enhance their sentinel surveillance systems [94].
Despite high hepatitis C prevalence, Egypt is on track to
achieve WHO elimination targets [1].
Ways forward and future challenges
To achieve the WHO 2030 elimination targets, DAA
prices, including those governments or insurers pay per
course and for individual patients, must generally fall to
ensure universal access [95]. Governments need to negoti-
ate drug prices and be prepared to use the TRIPS flexibil-
ities to ensure satisfactory results. In countries such as
Denmark and the US, restrictions on negotiating drug
prices need to be removed. Up-to-date public information
about DAA availability and pricing is also important [11];
such transparency shows governments that pharmaceutical
companies are willing to negotiate a price that enables
elimination. Since 1986, Management Sciences for Health
and WHO have published the International Drug Price
Indicator Guide, which lists drug prices from non-profit
and procurement agencies – a valuable tool for tackling
drug pricing [96].
Public health approach in negotiations
Drug price negotiations appear to be cyclical. Upon
marketing approval, pharmaceutical companies often set
high prices [97]; governments then enter negotiations
with manufacturers, often with a fixed budget [40]. Reli-
able data on drug development and manufacturing costs
would assist governments to negotiate reasonable prices
[98] that take into account companies’ justifiable need
for profits. When drug development and manufacturing
costs have been recovered, governments may have an
easier time negotiating prices, enabling them (as in the
case of DAAs) to quickly adopt a public health approach
rather than an individual patient approach.
Pharmaceutical companies have shown preparedness
to negotiate reasonable prices for DAAs, particularly
when countries have comprehensive public health-based
viral hepatitis elimination plans that facilitate treatment
access for a large proportion of the affected population.
Gilead has demonstrated its willingness to provide vol-
untary licenses that enable certain countries to access
DAAs at a reduced price, as has GSK through the MPP.
Comprehensive viral hepatitis plans have centred on
treatment as prevention and hepatitis C elimination
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rather than treating individual patients. These plans
must be supported by reliable estimates of the number
of people needing treatment so that governments can
set elimination targets and monitor treatment outcomes.
However, there are challenges in establishing hepatitis C
surveillance systems (e.g. cost, establishing case defini-
tions, laboratory infrastructure, training staff ) [99], yet
governments can learn from countries with surveillance
systems in place (e.g. Australia, Egypt, Portugal).
Conclusion
History records very few opportunities to eliminate a
chronic infection. In the DAA era, eliminating hepatitis C
as a public health threat is possible, yet it can only be
achieved with affordable access to DAAs worldwide. Case
studies of Australia, Portugal and Egypt demonstrate that
comprehensive public health-based viral hepatitis plans
facilitate negotiations with pharmaceutical companies.
Shifting from individual-focused hepatitis C treatment to
elimination requires strong political will and advocacy. If
price negotiations with pharmaceutical companies do not
produce reasonable prices for DAAs, governments can util-
ise flexibilities in patent law to ensure access to low-priced
generic sources.
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